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DEON ROSQUIST, GERALDINE, 
ROSQUIST and ILA R. PAINTER, 
Individuals, and CARPETS, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendants, 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a corporation, 
Garnishee, 
FRED L. PAINTER, 
Intervener-Respondent . .. 
Case 
No. 11053 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-INTERVENER 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment 
granting a motion of the respondent intervener, Fred 
L. Painter, for release of funds alleged to belong to him 
and sought to be attached under a garnishment served 
upon First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as garnishee, 
and directed against assets of the defendants in the 
principal action, viz. Deon Rosquist, Geraldine Rosquist 
and Ila R. Painter. Fred L. Painter was not a party to 
the principal action. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Hearing was had in the lower court on the inter-
vener's motion and the court entered its findings of fact, 
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conclusions of law and judgment in intervener's favor. 
'I1he court found that the funds attempted to be garnished 
were the property of Fred L. Painter, and ordered the 
release of the garnishment and awarded intervener judg-
ment against plaintiff for interest on the amount sought 
to be garnished, also costs and attorney fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks for reversal of the judgment and an 
order awarding appellant garnishee judgment for the 
entire amount of a joint account standing in the names of 
Fred L. Painter and Ila R. Painter on the books of the 
garnishee, First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The relevant facts in this appeal are as follows: 
Plaintiff had a judgment against the defendants 
Deon Rosquist and Geraldine Rosquist, his wife, and 
Ila R. Painter, wife of the intervener, based upon a con-
tract for purchase of carpeting from the defendant Car-
pets Inc. allegedly signed by said defendants. (R. 8 and 
R. 33-34) The contract had been guaranteed and assigned 
by the defendant Carpets Inc. to plaintiff. The inter-
vener was not a party to such contract or such judgment. 
On February 3, 1964, plaintiff procured to be served 
upon First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., a garnishment 
issued under said judgment. (R. 35) The garnishee made 
answer to the garnishment reciting that it had no assets 
belonging to any of the judgment debtors, except as 
follows: (R. 36) 
"This bank had a joint deposit account in the 
name of Fred L. Painter and Ila R. Painter at 
the time of service of said writ, with a then bal-
2 
ance of $723.79, and on which we are informed 
some checks issued by Fred L. Painter were then 
outstanding. On February 6, 1964, we were served 
with written notice by said Fred L. Painter in 
which he stated that funds deposited in said joint 
account were his sole property and that he claims 
the same as sole owner. On February 7, 1964, he 
presented a check drawn by him against said 
joint account for withdrawal of the full amount 
remaining in said account, and demanded payment 
of said amount to him. In the absence of proof 
or knowledge to the contrary we assume that the 
statement and claim of Fred L. Painter are cor-
rect. Said Fred L. Painter and Ila R. Painter are 
also indebted to this bank on a note not yet due 
in an amount greater than the amount of said 
joint account at time of garnishment." 
No traverse or reply to the garnishee's answer was 
at any time filed by plaintiff nor did plaintiff at any 
time offer evidence to rebut it. On April 9, 1964, plain-
tiff filed a motion for judgment against the garnishee 
(R. 37) which motion was heard by the court on August 
7, 1964 and the court made the following order as shown 
by minutes of the court (R. 73) 
"The motion is argued to the Court by re-
spective counsel and submitted. Thereupon the 
Court denies plaintiff's motion without prejudice." 
The statement relating to this proceeding on Page 4 
of Appellant's Brief, that: 
"The court failed to enter a garnishee judg-
ment but charged First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A., with a continuing obligation to appellant in 
the sum of $723. 79" 
is clearly contrary to the ruling of the court. 
Plaintiff took no action at any time to implead Fred 
L. Painter. 
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His wife, Ila died February 12, 1966. (R. 42) On 
August 29, 1967, Fred filed his Motion for Leave to 
Intervene and to Dismiss Garnishment. (H. 40-41) This 
motion was supported by the following affidavit (R. 42-
43) 
"Fred L. Painter, of Nephi, Utah, being first 
duly sworn on oath deposes and says: 
That he is the surviving husband of Ila H,. 
Painter who was named as one of the defendants 
in the above entitled action and who was also 
named with this affiant as joint owner of a joint 
tenancy deposit account at the First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A., Nephi Branch, which deposit 
account is referred to in the answer of said bank 
to a writ of garnishment issued in the above en-
titled action and served upon said bank as garn-
ishee on or about February 3, 1964. This affiant 
was not a party defendant in said action and was 
not a party to the judgment rendered therein. 
Referring to the said deposit account this 
affiant on oath says that at the time said garnish-
ment was served upon said garnishee, the said 
Ila R. Painter and this affiant were indebted to 
said garnishee in an amount greater than the 
amount of said deposit account and further on 
oath says that the funds deposited in said account 
were, at the respective times of deposit, the sole 
property of this affiant and not the property of 
his said wife, Ila R. Painter. 'I1he said Ila R. 
Painter died the 12th day of February 1966 and 
whatever right or title she had in said joint ten-
ancy account was thereby terminated, and this 
affiant, by right of survivorship, succeeded to sole 
ownership of said account, subject only to the 
right of said bank to offset said account against 
indebtedness owing by affiant to it. 
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This affidavit is made in support of a mo-
tion to be made to the above entitled court for 
release and discharge of said writ of garnishment 
issued in the above entitled action and served upon 
said bank as garnishee." 
s/ Fred L. Painter" 
The motion for leave to intervene was granted (R. 
44) and the matter was heard September 15, 1967. (R. 45) 
Plaintiff filed no counter-affidavit and offered no evi-
dence to rebut the intervener's affidavit. (R. 45 and R. 
58) Also no evidence was offered of any joint signature 
card or joint tenancy agreement. The court made and 
filed its Memorandum Decision (R. 45) reciting as fol-
lows: 
"The matter was fully argued by all parties 
involved, taken under advisement by the Court, 
and the Court now being fully advised in the prem-
ises finds that said garnishment should be re-
leased, particularly in view of the fact that no 
counter - affidavits were filed controverting the 
affidavit of Fred L. Painter which appears to 
the Court, by clear and convincing evidence that 
he was, at the time of said garnishment, the real 
owner of said joint bank account, and the Court 
further finds that the intervener is entitled to 
interest on said account, together with attorney 
fees in he sum of $250.00." 
The Court on September 19, 1967 made and entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 57-59) 
which among other things recited that testimony was 
offered on the part of the intervener; that no testimony 
was offered on the part of the plaintiff or the garnishee; 
that the matter was argued and submitted; also: 
"The Court finds from the affidavit of the 
intervener and from the evidence presented herein 
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that said intervener was not a party d<>f endant in 
the above entitled action; that lla R. Painter ib 
now deceased; that tlH' funds dvposited in said 
joint bank account were at the fone of deposit the 
sole property of said intenener and not the prop-
erty of his wife, Ila R. Painter; that ::;aid inter-
vener was at the time of service of said writ of 
garnishment on said garnishee the true owner of 
said joint bank account; that by reason of service 
of said writ of garnishment t·mid intervener has 
been continuously depriv<>d of mw of funds con-
stituting said joint account. 
"That the intervener has made numerous de-
mands upon the plaintiff, Beehive Stak Bank, 
for release of said funds but such demands have 
been wrongfully refused and said plaintiff con-
tinues to refuse to release said writ or said funds. 
That the intervener has been compelled to employ 
an attorney to institute these proceedings to pro-
cure release of said funds from the claim of the 
plaintiff. That $250.00 is a reasonable sum to be 
allowed the intervener for services of his attorney 
herein." 
Judgment in Garnishment Proceeding:s wa:s signed 
and entered September 19, 1967, (R 50) in accordance 
with the Findings and Conclusions of the Court. 
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law (R. 4G-49) which motion was 
denied by the court. (R. 5G) Notice of Appeal was filed 
by plaintiff October 19, 19G7. (H. GG-G7) Record on 
Appeal vrns filed November 2S, 19G7. No Reporter's 





THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER 
COURT ARE SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT AND 
UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE. 
Respondent intervener submits that no logical or 
legal basis exists to justify a reversal of the trial court's 
decision. The answer of the garnishee (R. 35) shows that 
the intervener claimed to be sole owner of funds deposited 
in the joint account; also that both the intervener and 
hjs wife, Ila R. Painter, were indebted to the garnishee 
at the time of service of the garnishment in an amount 
exceeding the then balance of the account. That answer 
was not controverted. 
The affidavit filed by intervener in support of his 
motion for release of the garnishment, likewise recited 
that all funds deposited in the joint account were his 
individual funds; also that he and his wife, Ila, were 
indebted to the garnishee at the time of the service of 
the garnishment in an amount greater than the balance 
in the joint account. The account in question was a 
checking account in the total sum at time of the writ 
of $723.79. It was used for convenience of the parties 
in paying household expenses and replenished from time 
to time by the intervener. It is idle for plaintiff to argue 
as it does on page 11 of its brief that there is a presump-
tion of ownership in each of the joint tenants of a bank 
account and that: 
"Respondent has not introduced a scintilla of 
competent evidence to overcome this presump-
tion." 
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An answer of a garnishee which is not denied or 
rebutted should be taken as admitted. And an affidavit 
filed in support of a motion, when not controverted or 
rebutted by evidence, obviously justifies a finding of 
the truth of its allegations. 
Rule 43 ( e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
( e) Evidence on Motions. \Vhen a motion is 
based on facts not appearing of record the court 
may hear the matter on affidavits presented by 
the respective parties, but the court may direct 
that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral 
testimony." 
In this case the court stated in its Memorandum Decision 
(R. 45) that it found by clear and convincing evidence 
that the intervener was at the time of the garnishment 
the owner of the joint account. The plaintiff has not 
seen fit to file any reporter's transcript of the evidence 
at the hearing on the intervener's motion, or any of the 
other proceedings in the case, and is therefore not in 
a position to attack the court's findings. 
POINT II 
A JOINT BANK ACCOUNT IS NOT SUBJECT TO 
GARNISHMENT UNDER A JUDGMENT AGAINST 
ONE OF THE JOINT OWNERS EXCEPT TO THE 
EXTENT OF THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR'S INTER-
EST, AND. ANY PRESUMPTION OF OWNERSHIP 
OF AN INTEREST IN THE ACCOUNT IS REBUT-
TABLE. 
It is obvious from plaintiff's brief that counsel bases 
his appeal for reversal upon the theory that where a bank 
account stands in the names of two persons jointly there 
is a presumrition of ownership in eaeh of them and that 
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by reason of this presumption a garnishment under a 
judgment against one is binding not only to the extent 
of that party's contribution to or interest in the fund but 
against the entire account to the extent of the judgment 
debt. 
Counsel quotes from and relies upon the cases of 
Neill V. Royce, 101Utah181, 120 Pac. 2d 327 (1941) and 
Tangren v. Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d 388, 367 Pac. 2d 179, 
t1961). 
A study of these cases discloses not only that they 
do not sustain appellant's position but on the contrary 
support the decision of the trial court. In each case it 
vvas expressly held that the presumption upon which 
plaintiff here relies is a rebuttable presumption and that 
proof as to the true ownership of the funds is admissible. 
And in the Tangren case it was held that even after the 
death of one of the joint tenants, the presumption of 
ownership in the surviving joint tenant may be overcome 
by clear and convincing evidence. The headnote in that 
case recites: 
"Courts are liberal in permitting proof as to 
true ownership of funds held in joint savings ac-
count." 
It is noteworthy that in each of these cases the opin-
ion quotes with approval Chief .Justice Cardozo in the 
case of Moskowitz vs. Marrow, 251 N.Y. 380, 167 N.E. 
506, 66 A.L.R. 870: 
"The plain implication is that as between the 
depositors themselves, the form of the deposit 
gives rise to a presumption and nothing more." 
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In the case at bar it should be kept in mind that 
there was no proof of a signature card or written agree-
ment covering the joint account. In Neill v. Royce and 
Tangren v. Ingalls the depositors had signed a joint 
tenancy signature card supplied by the bank. In spite 
of the terms of such agreement it was held that proof 
was admissible to show the true intent of the depositors 
and the true ownership of the funds. 
POINT III. 
UTAH CASE LAW ESTABLISHES THAT EVI-
DENCE IS ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW INTENTION OF 
THE PARTIES AND THE TRUE OWNERSHIP OF 
FUNDS IN A JOINT BANK ACCOUNT. 
An excellent and exhaustive review of Utah cases 
relating to joint bank accounts is found in 8 Utah Law 
Review, No. 1, pages 57-69. The review discusses and 
analyzes Utah cases - also other cases cited and relied 
upon by appellant herein - and convincingly shows that 
Utah case law does not sustain appellant's postion, but 
on the contrary upholds the trial court's decision. 
On page 7 of appellant's brief counsel refers to the 
Utah Law Review article mentioned, and quotes a por-
tion of one paragraph from the article - but stops short 
of the more relevant portions immediately following, 
which read as follows: 
"Because the problem of proof is different 
when a creditor is concerned, it may be justifiable 
to presume that the debtor owns one-half the 
account and to permit evidence to be adduced in 
rebutting the presumption as to what the actual 
ownership of the parties to the account was. This 
rule wasadopted by the Utah Court in Neill v. 
Royce. 
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Other courts have taken the position that a 
creditor may reach only that part of the fund 
actually contributed by the debtor. This view re-
sults in problems of determining the amount of the 
contributions and withdrawals. It may also be 
unsatisfactory when the depositor has made a 
present gift of part or the whole amount to the 
debtor. 
A third view, stressing the right to withdraw, 
holds that the whole amount is available to the 
creditor of either party. This may work an in-
justice if applied when the debtor is only an agent 
with no present ownership in the account. 
The Utah position seems essentially sound. 
The burden is shifted to the parties to the account, 
and the depositor may prove the extent of his 
interest to avoid its garnishment by his co-owner's 
creditor." 
8 Utah Law Review, No. 1 at pages 65-66 
Appellant cites the case of Hanks v. Hales, 17 Utah 
2d 344, 411 Pac. 2d 836, which involved joint bank ac-
counts where joint tenancy signature cards had been 
signed. Counsel quotes from the case and relies upon 
a statement that such instruments are endowed with a 
presumption of validity which can only be overcome 
by clear and convincing evidence. In that case the trial 
court had found the evidence insufficient and the appel-
late court affirmed. In the case at bar the trial court 
found from uncontroverted evidence that the intervener 
was the owner of the funds deposited in the joint account 
and that the judgment debtor had no interest in the funds. 
In Hanks v. Hales this court said: 
"Whether the required quantum of proof has 
been met is for the trial court to determine. When 
11 
it has done so, we could rule to the contrary only 
if 1all reasonable minds would so believe from the 
evidence." 
POINT IV 
BY REASON OF THE DEATH OF THE JUDGMENT 
DEBTOR, PLAINTIFF CANNOT ENFORCE ITS 
JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR GARNISHMENT. 
Sec. 75-9-11 of the probate code and Rule 69 (a) of 
the rules of civil procedure continue in effect the pro-
visions of the former code which were considered in the 
case of Weaver v. Weaver et al, 7 Ut. 299, 26 Pac. 581, 
in which it was held that the right to enforce a money 
judgment by execution was extinguished with the death 
of the judgment debtor and that the trial court therefore 
erred in ordering execution to issue against a garnishee 
to recoved upon a debt due from the deceased. The court 
said: 
"The plaintiff can have no greater right to 
enforce her judgment against the garnishee than 
she has against the judgment defendant, and when 
her right t.o have execution issue was terminated 
by the death of the defendant, no proceedings in 
garnishment could be begun or carried on. Drake 
in his work on Attachrrnmts says: 'The plain-
tiff's right to hold a garnishee exists only so long 
as, in the suit in which the garnishment takes 
place, he has a right to enforce his claim against 
the defendant. When his remedy against the lat-
ter is at ·an end, so is his recourse against the 
garnishee. That the latter may show that the 
plaintiff's right against him has been thus termin-
ated cannot be doubted.' Drake Attchm. (2d Ed.) 
Sec. 459." 
Counsel for appellant at page 14 of their brief cite 
the Weaver casP but argue that the rule therein does 
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not apply in this case by reason of the fact that judgment 
was obtained against Ila R. Painter and garnishment 
served prior to her death. That argument was used in 
the Idaho case of Rose v. Dunbar, 115 Pac. 920, and was 
expressly overruled, the court saying: 
"It was evidently the purpose of the Legis-
lature in enacting Section 4475 to preclude the 
issuance of an execution after the death of the 
judgment debtor on a plain money judgment, and 
in such case a lien acquired by attachment, or 
other statutory process in aid of the collection of 
the judgment, could not be enforced by execution 
after the death of the judgment debtor." 
POINT V. 
FUNDS IN THIS JOINT BANK ACCOUNT WERE 
NOT SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT BY REASON OF 
THE FACT THAT BOTH ILA R. PAINTER AND 
FRED L. PAINTER WERE INDEBTED TO THE 
GARNISHEE AT THE TIME OF SERVICE OF THE 
WRIT IN AN AMOUNT EXCEEDING THE AMOUNT 
OF THE JOINT ACCOUNT. 
Rule 64 D (m) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides as follows : 
"Every garnishee shall be allowed to retain 
or deduct out of the property, effects or credits 
of the defendant in his hands, all demands against 
the plaintiff and against the defendant of which 
he could have availed himself if he had not been 
served as garnishee, whether the same are at the 
time due or not. Such garnishee shall be liable 
for the balance only after all mutual demands be-
tween himself and the plaintiff and defendant are 
adjusted, not including unliquidated damages for 
wrongs and injuries. The verdict or finding, if 
any, and the judgment shall show against which 
party any such claim is allowed, and the amount 
thereof. 
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The answer of the garnishee (R. 36) and the affi-
davit of the intervener (R. 42) each recite that at time 
of service of the garnishment both Ila R. Painter and 
Fred L. Painter were indebted to the garnishee in an 
amount greater than the amount of the joint bank account. 
There was no contrary evidence. 
POINT VI. 
INTERVENER IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES AND 
ATTORNEY FEES, INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES 
ON APPEAL, BY REASON OF PLAINTIFF'S CON-
TINUING REFUSAL TO RELEASE THE WRONG-
FUL GARNISHMENT .. 
"In an action for wrongful garnishment which 
is not malicious, the measure of damages is the 
actual injury sustained under the general rules 
barring remote or speculative consequences. In-
terest and attorney's fees may be allowed. . . . In 
the absence of loss or deterioration of the prop-
erty garnished, the value of its use during the 
period of detention, together with the necessary 
expenses of regaining possession, constitutes a 
fair measure of damages. Where the garnishment 
was of money or notes, legal interest during the 
period of detention constitutes the value of its 
use which may be recovered as damages~" 
38 C.J .S. 612 Sec. 313 b. 
Adair v. James M. Peterson Bank 61 Utah 
159, 211 Pac. 683 St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. 
Love, 57 Utah 450, 195 Pac. 305 28 C.J. 544. 
"Attorney fees necessarily expended by the 
garnishee or claimant by reason of the wrongful 
garnishment may be recovered as damages." 
38 C.J.S~ 613, n. 85 
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Oklahoma State Bank v. Reed, 288 Pac. 281, 
283, 143 Okla. 131, 85 ALR 635. 
"Exemplary or punitive damages are recover-
able where thegarnishment was not only wrong-
ful but malicious or vexatious." 
38 C.J.S. 613, n. 87 
In this case the trial court found (R. 59) 
"That the intervener has made numerous de-
mands upon the plaintiff, Beehive State Bank, for 
release of said funds but such demands have been 
wrongfully refused and said plaintiff continues to 
refuse to release said writ or said funds. That the 
intervener has been compelled to employ an attor-
ney to institute these proceedings to procure re-
lease of said funds." 
From these findings it is clear that the intervener 
is entitled at least to compensatory damages, including 
interest and 'attorney fees, and attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the respondent intervener submits that 
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed and 
that respondent should have his costs, including attorney 
fee on appeal. 
WILLL.HOYT 
31 South Main St., 
Nephi, Utah, 84648 
.Attorney for Respondent 
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